Superman, Wittgenstein and the Disappearance of Moorean Absurdity by WILLIAMS, John N.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School of Social Sciences School of Social Sciences
7-2002
Superman, Wittgenstein and the Disappearance of
Moorean Absurdity
John N. WILLIAMS
Singapore Management University, johnwilliams@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Social Sciences at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School of Social Sciences by an authorized administrator of Institutional
Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
WILLIAMS, John N., "Superman, Wittgenstein and the Disappearance of Moorean Absurdity" (2002). Research Collection School of
Social Sciences. Paper 9.
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/9
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soss_research/9
 SMU HUMANITIES & SOCIAL SCIENCES 
WORKING PAPER SERIES 
     
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Superman, Wittgenstein and the                
Disappearance of Moorean Absurdity        
 
 
 
 
 
 
John N. Williams 
 
July 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paper No. 3-2002 
ANY OPINIONS EXPRESSED ARE THOSE OF THE AUTHOR(S) AND NOT NECESSARILY THOSE OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIAL SCIENCES, SMU 
Superman, Wittgenstein and the disappearance of Moorean 
absurdity 
 
JOHN N. WILLIAMS (UNDER THE GUISE OF LOIS LANE) 
 
‘You have known me for years, Lois’ explains Superman, as I lay aside my copy of 
Crimmins’s example (1992). ‘But there is something you have not yet discovered. You 
also know me under a disguise. You have not yet realized that this person is I in disguise. 
On that way of thinking about me, you have different opinions of me. In fact you think 
me an idiot.’ 
I’ve just informed Superman that I accept his testimony on the strength of his 
intelligence. But I confess I don’t quite know how to acknowledge my acceptance of his 
final remark. Had he let me know the identity of the person with whom I’m acquainted 
and who I think idiotic, then I wouldn’t have this problem. For example, had he informed 
me that his alter ego is Clark then (since I know that Superman would lose his sex appeal 
but not his intelligence if disguised as Clark) I would have to stop believing that Clark is 
an idiot. For otherwise I would have to start believing that Superman is an idiot, but we 
both know that’s not true. In that case I could simply inform Superman that I have just 
changed my mind about Clark. But I can’t do that in this case since I don’t know which 
idiot he has in mind. All I know is that I don’t pick out that person by the description of 
Superman’s normal guise, namely ‘the only person with the letter S emblazoned on his 
chest’. Nonetheless Superman surely won’t object if I suppose for the sake of argument 
that his alter ego is one of a domain of several persons1, for example, my colleagues at 
the Daily Planet and that I can pick out that mysterious person by a description of 
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Superman’s disguise, such as ‘the only mild mannered reporter who wears goofy 
glasses’.  
The problem is that I don’t want to tell Superman that I now mistakenly believe that 
he’s an idiot. For Wittgenstein pointed out (1953:190) that if there were a verb meaning 
‘to believe falsely’, it would not have any significant first person present indicative2. He 
did so in response to Moore’s famous observations that to say,  
(A) I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did 
 (1942: 543) 
 
or 
 
(B) I believe that he has gone out, but he has not 
 (1944: 204), 
 
would be ‘absurd’ (1942: 543; 1944: 204). We may represent as these as 
 
(a)  p & I don’t believe that p  
 
and 
 
(b) p & I believe that not-p. 
 
These are semantically distinct. For (a) reports a specific instance of my ignorance but 
(b) reports my specific mistake in belief, a difference that is inherited from that between 
agnostics and atheists. So Wittgenstein’s label (1953: 190), ‘Moore’s paradox’ is 
unfortunately singular. Besides, the elusive explanation of why it is absurd of me to say 
or even believe something that might me true of me is hardly a paradox in the sense of an 
apparently impeccable argument that leads from commonsense premises to a patently 
false conclusion. A better label is ‘Moorean absurdity’. Wittgenstein (1974: 177) 
correctly attributes the importance of Moore’s examples to the fact that the absurdity is 
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‘similar to a contradiction, though it isn’t one’ and credits Moore for having ‘said 
something about the logic of assertion’. 
I don’t want to say anything absurd in any way to Superman, let alone  
(1a) You’re now not an idiot but I don’t believe that you’re not 
nor   
(1b) You’re now an idiot but I now believe you’re not, 
for it would be equally embarrassing to admit my ignorance in this way as my mistake. 
Nor would I be less embarrassed to say equivalently,  
(1a’) I now fail to recognise the fact that you are now not an idiot  
or  
(1b’) I now mistakenly believe that you are now an idiot.  
The way for me to avoid embarrassing Mooreanism is to remember that Moore used the 
word, ‘said’. 
Sayings (in other words voicings) come in a great variety. I may tell, remind, remark, 
inform or misinform you that p. I may let you know or tell you the lie that p. I may 
further observe, point out, confess, contend, announce or acknowledge to you that p. 
These are all assertions. I may succeed or fail in making them3. One way in which I can 
fail to assert anything to Superman is to fail to articulate my words. But that won’t get me 
off the hook, since I’m perfectly sober and we both speak English. The other way would 
be to show him I don’t mean a word of what I’m saying, as when I recite one of Lear’s 
nonsense poems. But that won’t do either, since I genuinely want to acknowledge his 
final remark.  
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So I don’t want to now utter the words of (1a’) or (1b’) to Superman as any kind of 
assertion. To succeed in making any assertion would be for me to achieve a specific aim 
to do with changing his mind, such as getting him to know (as in letting him know or 
confessing to him) or mistakenly believing (as in lying to him) or getting him to think I 
believe (as in avowing, contending or falsely confessing to him) that p. In any case that 
involves getting him to believe the truth of my words. But in no case can I succeed if I 
don’t also get him to believe that I’m sincere. One sharp difference between assertions is 
that if I successfully lie to him that p then I must get him to mistakenly believe that I’m 
sincere. The same holds for false confessions or contentions in which I controversially 
‘wind him up’.  
So my full aim in remarking anything to Superman must be to get him to believe that 
my words are true by getting him to think me sincere. A lot of folks (Williams 1966: §4) 
call this getting him to believe me. 
This is why Moorean assertions are absurd. If you believe me when I say to you that p 
& I believe not-p then you must believe that I believe that not-p (in virtue of believing 
what I say) and believe that I believe that p (in virtue of thinking me sincere). Since you 
can’t think that without thinking me an idiot, (because you think I hold contradictory 
beliefs) you won’t believe me. Similarly, you won’t believe me either when I attempt to 
tell you that p & I don’t believe that p, for then you would be the idiot in having the 
contradictory beliefs. Such would-be assertions are self-defeating, despite the fact that 
they might be true (because the denial of either fails to be a tautology). 
However the absurdities cannot be captured by the syntax of sentences4, since to say 
that  
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(2a) I have no beliefs now  
or that  
(3b) God knows that I am now an atheist 
would be similarly self-defeating, yet neither is essentially a conjunction (Williams 
1996).   
Happily for me, nor is the syntax of Moore’s examples sufficient for the paradigm 
absurdities to infect my sayings. For Wittgenstein also observes (1980b: §290) that 
‘under unusual circumstances’, sentences of the form of (a) or (b) ‘could be given a clear 
sense’. In these cases the absurdity disappears. Understanding why will save me 
embarrassment. It will also deepen our understanding of what Moorean absurdity is by 
more clearly demarcating what it is not.  
Wittgenstein’s first example (1980a: §485) is my exclamation to you, ‘He's coming 
but I still can't believe it’. His second (1980a: §486) is my announcement of the imminent 
arrival of a train, to which I add the aside, ‘Personally I don't believe it’. He also (1980a: 
§487) gives an example of a non-absurd (b)-type example in which I’m a soldier who 
produces military communiqués but adds that I believe them incorrect. Although I 
undergo no change of mind in any case, the absurdity is always expunged by your 
background knowledge that I’m not attempting an assertion at all. 
For unless you think me an idiot, you should not take the second part of my 
exclamation as the literal truth, but rather as an expression of amazement occasioned by 
my recognition of a fact that merits yet resists belief, rather as someone might announce 
‘incredible’ news. But half an assertion isn’t an assertion. Similarly you are not entitled 
to think that I mean what I say if I speak lines in a play. My articulate utterances under 
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the footlights may depict the assertions of my fictional guise but are hardly my assertions. 
Similarly your knowledge that I’m parroting the announcement that the train is imminent 
expunges absurdity since quoting isn’t asserting either. Nor is compulsorily transcribing 
words I know are false. In such cases I fail to speak in propria voce. Yet another type of 
disappearance of absurdity is when I make a transparent guess that p but admit I have no 
beliefs either way about its correctness.   
Nor am I guilty of Moorean beliefs in these cases either. I don’t think I lack the belief 
that he’s coming. Nor do I believe my guess or the announcement or communiqué I make 
out of propria voce. This fact is important, since Moore’s examples are not a jot less 
absurd if I believe but never voice them. Indeed one economical strategy is to explain the 
absurdity of my Moorean assertions in terms of that of my Moorean beliefs. This might 
be via some such notion as expressing belief (Williams 1999, Hajeck and Stoljar 2001, 
Rosenthal 2002). But before I attempt that I’d better explain the absurdity of Moorean 
belief: If I believe that (p & I don’t believe that p) then since (as nobody can seem to 
deny) believing a conjunction entails believing its conjuncts, I believe that p. So my 
belief is self-falsifying in the same way (except that this ‘conjunction principle’ isn’t 
needed) as (2a), despite the fact that it may be true and that I may believe it5. By contrast, 
if I believe that (p & I believe that not-p), what I believe might still be true, but only if I 
hold contradictory beliefs about whether p. 
We learned early in the search for the recalcitrant explanation of Moorean absurdity 
that the absurdity need not appear in sayings not conjugated in the first person voice. 
Thus it wouldn’t be absurd of me to now tell Superman that Lois now mistakenly 
believes he is now an idiot if he knows that in fact I am not Lois but Catwoman or if he 
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knows that I know or mistakenly believe I’m not Lois. Nor would it be absurd of me in 
the same way as Moore’s examples to tell him that my father’s only daughter now 
mistakenly believes that he is now an idiot, if he knows that my father has no daughter.  
A further case is when Superman knows that I’m so drunk that I don’t realise that the 
person I’m looking at in the mirror is me, because I mistakenly believe it’s not a mirror 
but a window. Were I to tell him that the person in the glass mistakenly believes that it’s 
raining, this would not be an absurd thing for me to believe, given the stupidity of my 
initial mistake. Moreover my words would become credible to Superman in virtue of his 
knowledge that I foolishly fail to know myself under the reflected guise.   
To respond to Superman with the literal words of (1b’) would be for me to attempt a 
self-defeating Moorean assertion. Let’s call my secondary attempt to get you to think me 
sincere in asserting to you that p, my ostensible expression of my belief that p, one that is 
truly an expression of my belief if I’m sincere. Let’s say too that my avowal of belief that 
p, by the words, ‘I believe that p’ is also my ostensible expression of my belief that that 
p, in virtue this time of my primary attempt to get you to believe my words (as well as my 
expression of my belief that I believe that p, in virtue of my secondary aim).  
Suppose I now utter (1b’) to Superman. If he is to believe the truth of my words then 
he must now believe that he is not now an idiot, which of course would come as no 
surprise to him, having known this for some time. Moreover I can hardly sensibly attempt 
to instil in him my knowledge of this fact, since I cannot sensibly believe what I know to 
be false. So I can hardly try to inform him or let him know this. Nor would my attempt 
fare any better as a lie, since Superman’s too smart to swallow my words, let alone think 
I wasn’t joking. 
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Moreover if he is to think me sincere he must now think that I now (mistakenly) 
believe that he is now an idiot. But he couldn’t think this unless he thinks me an idiot, 
firstly because I’ve just openly accepted his information in virtue of my public 
recognition that he is not now an idiot and secondly because he can’t think me sincere in 
avowing a belief that I simultaneously admit is mistaken. For although I can sensibly 
express my belief (which happens to be mistaken) I can’t sensibly express the mistake in 
that belief at the same time.  
For if I assert to you that (p & I believe that not-p) then I express to you my belief that 
p (in virtue of my secondary aim in asserting that p) and express to you my belief that 
not-p (in virtue of my primary aim in avowing to you that I believe that not-p)6 So I 
express the same pair of contradictory beliefs that you must ascribe to me if you are to 
believe me or that I must have if I non-mistakenly believe my own words7. 
So being the charitable and clever fellow he is, I know Superman won’t take my 
words literally any more than he would in Wittgenstein’s examples (since equally in 
those examples, I can’t be taken literally without being thought Moore-onic). Yet 
nonetheless Superman has said something true in his final remark. To acknowledge 
exactly what this is, I could try addressing Superman by name or under a description of 
his normal guise as ‘I now mistakenly believe that you, Superman, are now an idiot’ or ‘I 
now mistakenly believe that you, the only person with the letter S emblazoned on your 
chest, are now an idiot’. But that won’t work8 because Superman knows I believe nothing 
of the sort, mistakenly or otherwise, since I’ve just openly accepted his testimony on the 
strength of his intelligence.  
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Since I don’t know the identity of the idiot at the Daily Planet to whom he’s referring, 
I could try addressing him under a specification of a domain, as in ‘I now believe that 
you, one of several idiots at the Daily Planet, are now an idiot’. But that way won’t work 
either, since I’m now trying to address Superman, not one of those idiots. Nor could I 
address Superman under a description of his disguise, such as ‘the only mild mannered 
reporter who wears goofy glasses’ since I don’t know that this description picks out 
Superman. 
A better way is to relativize my sayings to times under guises. I have to relativize to 
times anyway, since we also know that no Moorean absurdity can be present in my 
assertions or beliefs if these are not conjugated in the present tense. For no absurdity 
arises if I say ‘Yesterday it was raining but I didn’t then believe it’, nor if I say 
‘Tomorrow I will mistakenly believe that Big Brother is not a fiction’ if we all know that 
today I’m due for brainwashing at the Ministry of Love. Thus a natural thing for me to 
say is ‘Whenever you, Superman, are disguised as one of those idiots at the Daily Planet 
I then mistakenly believe that you are an idiot’. This is not at all absurd because I am 
careful not to say that I now hold a belief that is mistaken. Likewise my (a)-type 
assertion, ‘Whenever you, Superman, are disguised as one of those idiots at the Daily 
Planet I fail to recognize the fact that you are not an idiot’ would be perfectly credible. 
The difference between the first of these replies and (1b’) is a bit like the difference 
between sensibly saying ‘Although you have always thought my opinions mistaken, you 
are invariably correct’ and absurdly saying,  
(4b) Although you invariably think my opinions mistaken, you are invariably 
correct 
 9
thus including my presently expressed belief within its sphere of reference.  
To make my address to Superman even clearer, I may relativize to guises as well, by 
replying, ‘Whenever you, Superman, are disguised as one of those idiots at the Daily 
Planet I then mistakenly believe that you, under that guise, are an idiot’.  
Put this way, my reply shares a further kinship with ‘Some of my beliefs are false’, 
since either tells you that not all my beliefs are always true. But saying this is a perfectly 
reasonable disclaimer of my infallibility9 that is has most probably been true of me for 
some time. Thus it fails to be absurd in the way Moore’s examples are absurd, because 
those examples reveal some deep epistemic contradiction-like flaw in me.  
Of course, my belief in my own disclaimer guarantees that I have at least one false 
belief. For by reductio ad absurdum, if my belief that I have at least one false belief is 
incorrect then all of my beliefs are correct, including my belief in this disclaimer. On the 
one hand this means I have inconsistent beliefs. On the other, it also means that my belief 
in my own mistakenness is infallible. Since I was most likely mistaken in some of my 
beliefs anyway, such a tight grasp of the truth of my mistakenness represents a useful 
heuristic for finding out the truth about which mistaken beliefs I hold by looking again at 
the quality of evidence. Similarly in my present dilemma I don’t know when my beliefs 
are mistaken, since I don’t know when I’m acquainted with Superman’s alter ego.  
Yet my belief escapes the epistemic flaw of Moorean belief because inconsistency in 
my beliefs does not necessarily undermine my justification in the way my self-falsifying 
or contradictory beliefs do. Any evidence that (absurdly) justifies me in believing that (p 
and I don’t believe that p) would justify me in believing what is then false. Moreover any 
evidence for my belief that p is ipso facto evidence against my belief that not-p and 
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conversely. By contrast, evidence for my belief in my occasional mistakenness need not 
count against any of my other beliefs, nor visa versa. Although I would now have 
inconsistent beliefs, I need not have contradictory ones. My belief in my disclaimer is not 
self-contradictory, since its truth does not entail its falsehood. Nor does my non-
mistakenly believing it entail beliefs that contradict each other, since we may consistently 
suppose that I don’t believe that all of my beliefs are true.  
Indeed I would be foolhardy if I said that I’m never mistaken in my beliefs, although 
not Mooreanly absurd in the way I would be in asserting the fact that  
(5b) All my beliefs are always mistaken 
or the fact that  
(5a) I always fail to recognize any fact. 
Suppose Superman had said instead ‘you also know me under two disguises. You have 
still not realized that I am either of these persons in disguise’. Superman then tells me 
that I think just one of those persons an idiot. Although I could sensibly admit that I have 
a mistaken belief, I still couldn’t sensibly assert (1b’).  Instead I would have to say, 
‘Whenever you, Superman, are disguised in one of two ways I either then mistakenly 
believe that you, when in the first disguise, are then an idiot or mistakenly believe that 
you, when in the second disguise, are then an idiot’.  
Now I know what to say to Superman, I’ll draw the moral. We need a definition of 
Moorean absurdity, but framing it in terms of sentential or propositional syntax would be 
both too narrow in excluding non-conjunctions like (2a) and (3b) and too broad in 
including Wittgenstein’s examples. Instead I propose  
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(MP) Any proposition is Moorean (in the spirit of Moore’s examples) just in 
case any ostensible assertor of it can be justifiably criticized as irrational, 
but only under the assumption that she believes it.10  
This fits the paradigm absurdities in Moore’s examples.  If I say (A) or (B) as a feeble 
attempt to share a joke with you, then you are entitled to criticize my sense of humour, 
but not my rationality. (MP) also rules out flat contradictions such as ‘I know that it’s 
both raining and not raining’ as well as other such cases in which the bare truth of what I 
say affords criticism of my rationality, such as ‘I believe that it’s both raining and not 
raining’ or ‘I believe that it’s raining but I have absolutely no justification for believing 
it’. It also excludes cases of pragmatic speech act absurdity such as ‘I’m asserting nothing 
now’ since I could correctly believe this in the recognition that I’m obeying my Trappist 
vows. In fact it includes genuine cases of Moorean absurdity such as (2a), (3b) and (4b) 
yet excludes all the spurious cases mentioned but not labeled in this paper, notably my 
admission that at least one of my beliefs is mistaken. For that reason we should not 
diagnose the irrationality of a Moorean believer as the commitment to the necessity of at 
least one false belief, but as a self-falsifying belief or one that entails contradictory 
beliefs. This will preserve the genuine difference between the two types of absurdity and 
enable us to decide if further examples are really Moorean11. 
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 Notes 
1. Hajeck and Stoljar (2001: 209) point out that this supposition is needed. 
2. This may have been the focus of Crimmins (1992). To be charitable, we 
should read ‘significant’ not as ‘having semantic content’ but as ‘having 
semantic content that can be communicated or successfully voiced’. 
3. By contrast, Rosenthal (2002: 169) claims that ‘if one utters something but 
does not actually have the thought that one’s utterance purports to express, 
that utterance cannot figure in the performing of a genuine illocutionary act’. 
But surely lies are as much assertions as honest announcements. Rather than 
denying that a lie is a genuine speech act, we should say that is it is genuinely 
the speech act of someone who is not genuine.  Moreover had Superman 
known that my assertion of (1a’) was a lie, this would increase, not expunge 
the absurdity. 
4. Against Hajeck and Stoljar’s (2001: 212) suggestion and Rosenthal’s (2002: 
171) diagnosis of the absurdities. 
5. To call such a thing a ‘blindspot’ (Sorensen 1988:52-3) suggests that there is a 
fact I can’t see, as if a truth remains that I couldn’t believe. But in reality my 
belief destroys that truth. 
6. Rosenthal (2002: 168) denies that my assertion that I believe that p expresses 
my belief that p on the grounds that it reports my belief that p and thereby 
expresses my higher-order belief that I believe that p. In fact it does both. 
When I make an assertion that q, I offer you reason to think I’m telling the 
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truth. But when q is my assertion that I believe that p, I thus offer you a reason 
to think I believe that p. I also offer you reason to think I’m sincere and so 
also express a belief that I believe that p 
7. In contradiction of Rosenthal (2002:167). 
8. Since Rosenthal concedes that the truth of a Mooreanism wouldn’t make it 
assertible he should find no difficulty (2002: 168) in the claim that it’s not 
expressible either. 
9. This is the lesson of the so-called ‘preface paradox’. 
10. By contrast, Hajeck and Stoljar’s (2001: 212-3) diagnosis of expressing 
contradictory beliefs excludes any (a)-type instance of Moorean absurdity. 
Rosenthal’s diagnosis (2002: 171) that a Moorean sentence denies the 
occurrence of the intentional state that it also purports to express, fails to 
explain (b)-type cases in which I deny nothing but rather affirm a belief. 
11. Thus Sorensen’s examples (2000: 30), ‘God exists but I don’t believe that I’m 
a theist’ and ‘God exists but I believe that I’m an atheist’ although absurd, fail 
to be Moorean.   
